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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Martin Edmo lsh appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence
entered following a jury verdict of guilty for possession of a controlled substance.
Specifically, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the state
to sustain a persistent violator verdict and asserts the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Law enforcement stopped the vehicle lsh was driving for an expired
registration violation. (PSI, p.2.) lsh smelled of alcohol and failed field sobriety
tests. (Id.) Upon his arrest, lsh was found to be in possession of a three-inch
straw that he used to "snort crushed hydrocodone." (Id.) The substance in the
snort tube was tested and determined to be methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.2-3.)
The state charged lsh with possession of a controlled substance (R,
pp.37-38) and with a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent violator (R,
pp.39-40).

The matter proceeded to trial where the jury found lsh guilty of

possession of a controlled substance (R, p.191; JT Tr., p.257, L.25 - p.258, L.7)
and of being a persistent violator of the law (R, p.192; JT Tr., p.267, Ls.6-23).
The court sentenced lsh to a 12-year unified sentence with the first four
years fixed followed by eight years indeterminate. (R., pp.227-231; 2/13/12 Tr.,
p.101, Ls.10-11.) lsh timely appealed. (R, pp.239-242.)

1

ISSUES

lsh states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the persistent violator
finding?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of twelve years, with four years fixed, upon
Mr. lsh following his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) as a persistent violator?

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Was there substantial competent evidence to support the jury's verdict
finding lsh a persistent violator?
2. Has lsh failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a 12-year unified sentence with the first four years fixed where lsh is a
persistent violator?
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ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence From Which The Jury Could
Conclude lsh Was A Persistent Violator Of The Law

A.

Introduction
lsh asserts there was insufficient evidence presented to support the jury's

verdict finding him guilty of being a persistent violator. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-5.)
Specifically, lsh contends the "evidence tying him to [the second conviction] was
insufficient as a matter of law to support a persistent violator finding."
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) lsh is incorrect.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State

v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360,365,283 P.3d 107,112 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller,
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121
Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735
P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the appellate court
will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson,
121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d
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at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955
P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Support The Jury Verdict
Finding lsh Guilty Of Being A Persistent Violator
lsh was convicted of the persistent violator enhancement for prior

convictions for possession of methamphetamine and three counts of burglary.
(R., pp.39-40; State's Exhibits 6, 7 (4-19/13 Augmentation).)

On appeal, lsh

does not challenge the adequacy of the evidence supporting the finding of the
prior possession conviction, but contends the evidence showing the prior
burglary convictions is "insufficient as a matter of law to support a persistent
violator finding" because it "only contained the same first and last names as Mr.
lsh." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Application of the relevant law to the record shows
lsh's claim is without merit.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a federal judgment from another
state, standing alone, is not sufficient to support a persistent violator holding.
See State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875, 880, 643 P.2d 555, 560 (Ct. App. 1982).
In Martinez, the state sought to prove Martinez's persistent violator status
through the introduction of a prior Idaho state conviction in addition to a prior outof-state federal conviction and testimony regarding fingerprint comparisons. (!Q.)
Although the court noted that a copy of the federal judgment out of California
standing alone would be insufficient to support the persistent violator verdict,
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mug shots and a positive fingerprint analysis could, and did, establish "the
defendant Martinez as the person convicted of the federal offense." (J.g.)
In State v. Medrain, 143 Idaho 329, 144 P.3d 34 (Ct. App. 2006), the
Court of Appeals found the evidence presented that Medrain "bore the same
name as the person referred to in the [prior] judgments of conviction ... , with
nothing more, was legally insufficient" to support a persistent violator verdict.
Medrain, 143 Idaho at 332-33, 144 P.3d at 37-38.
However, in State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170, 244 P.3d 1256 (Ct. App.
2011), the court considered what type of evidence in addition to the traditionally
accepted identification evidence was sufficient to allow a trier of fact to identify a
defendant as having been the same person implicated in a prior conviction.
Personally identifying evidence includes fingerprints, pictures, testimony of law
enforcement or court officials identifying the defendant as the subject of the prior
conviction, admission of culpability in prior convictions, and evidence establishing
identical driver's license number, sex, race, and date of birth. Lawyer, 150 Idaho
at 173-74, 244 P .3d at 1259-60. Non personal evidence as considered by other
jurisdictions includes similar character of offenses as well as convictions
occurring in the same jurisdictions. Lawyer, 150 Idaho at 174, 244 P.3d at 1260.
The Court of Appeals considered the presentation of personal identity evidence
in addition to nonpersonal evidence of identity such as the "same crime
committed in the same county" and found "a combination of personal and
nonpersonally identifying evidence, when considered together, may at some
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point be sufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt." Lawyer, 150
Idaho at 174, 244 P.3d at 1260.
The Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Parton, 154 Idaho
558, 300 P.3d 1046 (2013), is instructive. In Parton, the defendant argued "that,
as a matter of law, the same name and same date of birth are not sufficient to
prove that Defendant was the person convicted in the [prior] judgment." Parton,
154 Idaho at_, 300 P.3d at 1057. After noting the legal standards applicable
to sufficiency of the evidence claims, the Court rejected Parton's argument,
explaining:
The [prior] judgment was admitted without objection. The
name of the defendant on the judgment was "DARIN WILLIAM
which are identical
PARTON" and his date of birth was
to Defendant's full name and date of birth. No contradictory
evidence was presented, nor was there any argument that
Defendant had a common name. The jury was not required to
reach its verdict beyond any possible doubt. It was only required to
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Darin William Parton
named in the [prior] judgment was the same Darin William Parton
on trial in this case. The jury's verdict finding that it was is
supported by substantial evidence.
Parton, 154 Idaho at_, 300 P.3d at 1057-58.
Here, lsh asserts Exhibit 7, containing only "the same first and last names
as Mr. lsh" is "insufficient as a matter of law to support a persistent violator
finding." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) The evidence offered by the state in this case,
however, is not so limited.
In support of its allegation that lsh is a persistent violator, the state offered
two certified judgments of conviction, identified as State's Exhibits 6 and 7.
(Exhibits 6 and 7, 4/19/13 Augmentation.)
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Based on this evidence, the jury

convicted lsh of being a persistent violator. (R., p.192.) Exhibit 7, which was
offered and admitted, without objection, as a self-authenticating document
indicates the defendant, "MARTIN ISH," pied guilty to two counts of burglary in
the first degree. (Exhibit 7, 4/19/13 Augmentation.)

Consistent with this

identifying information, the arresting officer in lsh's current case testified as to
lsh's name. (JT Tr., p.261, Ls.20-25.) Exhibit 7 was admitted without objection,
containing the same first and last name as Martin lsh. All three convictions were
out of Bannock County.

There was no evidence presented to contradict the

legitimacy of the prior conviction, nor was there any argument that lsh had a
common name. Exhibit 7, in addition to reflecting Martin lsh's name, also came
from the same county as lsh's current conviction and the conviction established
by Exhibit 6.

While the state did not offer the types of evidence previously

included in considering the sufficiency of evidence in other cases involving a
challenge to a persistent violator enhancement, such as fingerprints, mug shots,
and a social security number, this does not mean the evidence submitted in this
case was insufficient.

Additionally, lsh's date of birth,

also

correlated with his 1975 conviction while he was a "minor" (under 21). (Compare
JT Tr., p.263, Ls.10-12 with Exhibit 7, 4/19/13 Augmentation, pp.1 (dated
judgment), 4 (lsh was a minor).) The number of people who were under the age
of 21 named "Martin lsh" found in Bannock County in 1975 has to be very limited.
Evidence that a felony judgment was previously entered against an
individual with the same name, of the same general age, coming from the same
county as lsh was sufficient for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
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that lsh was the same person formerly convicted pursuant to the judgment
admitted as Exhibit 7.
lsh has failed to establish the state presented insufficient evidence to
support the jury's conclusion that he is a persistent violator.

11.
lsh Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion

A.

Introduction
lsh asserts on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in

imposing a 12-year unified sentence in light of the de minimis nature of the
offense he was convicted of. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) lsh has failed to meet his
burden of establishing the excessiveness of his sentence and has thereby failed
to establish that the district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate

court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v.
Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006).

To prevail, the

appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope,
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing."
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State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement. State v.
Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 777, 769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989).

A

sentence that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772,
653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to
the length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of
the sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490
(1992).

C.

lsh Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In Sentencing
On appeal, lsh asserts that "in light of the mitigating circumstances

present, most importantly the de minimis nature of the offense, the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with
four years fixed[.]"

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)

To establish that his sentence is

excessive, lsh must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the
sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting
society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment or retribution.

In this case,

the district court noted in sentencing that although lsh had not had a felony
conviction since 2003, he had lived far from a law-abiding life in that time:
... your attorney is emphasizing your felony history and the fact that
you haven't had a felony since 2003. Frankly, I don't think that's
that long ago, but even taking that into account, the reality is that
since 2003 that felony - I didn't count them, but I will, there have
been 14 misdemeanors.
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So to imply today that since you got out of prison on your
last felony you have been a law-abiding citizen would be completely
contrary to that record. The fact of the matter is that you have
continued to engage in criminal behavior which has for one reason
or another beyond my control resulted in numerous misdemeanor
convictions although no additional felonies have been charged.
(2/13/12 Tr., p.99, Ls.2-15.) The court also took into consideration the fact that
lsh had continued "blaming law enforcement for [his] charges."

(2/13/12 Tr.,

p.100, Ls.3-4.)
lsh argues on appeal the court should have considered the de minimis
nature of the offense he was convicted of, claiming that his conviction for the
possession of a "snort straw containing methamphetamine residue" was "akin to
possession of paraphernalia." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) lsh cites to no authority for
the position that "the de minimis nature of [an] offense" (Appellant's brief, p.7)
requires a lesser sentence that completely overlooks his ongoing pattern of drug
use and law violations.

As the court noted in sentencing, "despite ongoing

substance abuse problems for many years," lsh described his drug use as
"recreational" and "simply could care less whether or not [he was] engaging in
criminal behavior." (2/13/12 Tr., p.100, Ls.6-12.)
The district court's unified sentence of 12 years with four years fixed for
lsh's conviction for possession of a controlled substance with a persistent violator
enhancement is entirely reasonable in light of the nature of the crime, lsh's
significant criminal record, and his continued failure to take responsibility for his
criminal actions.

lsh has failed to show that the district court abused its

sentencing discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to uphold lsh's judgment of
conviction and sentence.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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